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In  this  paper  I  attempt  to  show  that  mathematical  economics  is  unreasonably  ineffective. 
Unreasonable,  because  the  mathematical  assumptions  are  economically  unwarranted;  ineffective 
because  the  mathematical  formalizations  imply  non-constructive  and  uncomputable  structures.  A 
reasonable and effective mathematization of economics entails Diophantine formalisms. These come 
with natural undecidabilities and uncomputabilites. In the face of this, I conjecture that an economics 
for  the  future  will  be  freer  to  explore  experimental  methodologies  underpinned  by  alternative 
mathematical  structures.  The  whole  discussion  is  framed  within  the  context  of  the  celebrated 
Wignerian theme: The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. 
 
Key Words: General Equilibrium Theory, Computable General Equilibrium, Computable Economics, 
Constructive Mathematics, Mathematical Economics. 
 






"Well, you know or don't you kennet or haven't I told you every telling has a taling and that's the 
he and the she of it." 
James Joyce: Finnegan's Wake, p.213 
 
Eugene Wigner's Richard Courant Lecture in the Mathematical Sciences, delivered at New York 
University on May 11, 1959, was titled, picturesquely and, perhaps, with intentional impishness The 
Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences, (Wigner, 1960). Twenty years 
later, another distinguished scientist, Richard W. Hamming, gave an invited lecture to the Northern 
California Section of the Mathematical Association of America with the slightly truncated title The 
Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics, (Hamming, 1980). A decade or so later Stefan Burr tried 
a different variant of Wigner's title by organising a short course on The Unreasonable Effectiveness of 
Number Theory, (Burr, 1993). Another decade elapsed before Arthur Lesk, a distinguished molecular 
biologist at Cambridge, gave a lecture at the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences at 
Cambridge University where yet another twist to the Wigner theme was added: The Unreasonable 
Effectiveness of Mathematics in Molecular Biology, (Lesk, 2000). First a physicist; then a computer 
scientist; then number theorists and, finally, also molecular biologists; so why not an economist, too? 
But note that my title is not about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in economics; I am, 
instead, referring to its ineffectiveness. I was not a little influenced by the story behind Arthur Lesk's 
eventual choice of title (Lesk, 2001). 
I.M. Gelfand, a noted mathematician, had suggested as a counterpoint to Wigner's thesis his own 
principle  on  The  Unreasonable  Ineffectiveness  of  Mathematics  in  the  Biological  Sciences.  Lesk, 
unaware of the Wigner-Gelfand principle at the time his talk was conceived, had himself suggested a 
similar title for his own talk at the Newton Institute but was persuaded by the organisers to retain the 
Wignerian flavour by dropping ineffective in favour of effective. To his surprise, when his talk was 
published in The Mathematical Intelligencer, the editors of the Journal, without his approval or 
knowledge, had inserted an inset (Lesk, 2000, p.29) describing the anecdote of the genesis of the 
Wigner-Gelfand principle. This prompted Lesk to recount the genesis of his own title in a subsequent 
issue of the Journal (Lesk, 2001) where he admitted that his preferred choice had been a title with the 
word Ineffective. He had proposed, to the organisers of a conference on 'Biomolecular Function and 
Evolution in the Context of the Genome Project', at the Newton Institute, in 1998, a talk with the title 
On the Unreasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics in Molecular Biology, which he - Lesk - thought 
reflected `an echo of E.P.Wigner'. At this point the following reactions by the convener ensued: 
 
“A prolonged and uneasy silence. Then: "But, you see, this is not quite the message that we 
want to send these people." More silence. Then: "Would you consider changing `ineffective' 
to `effective'?" Lesk, 2001, p.14. 
 
Lesk acquiesced, but did go on to point out that: 
 
“Of course, the change in title had absolutely no effect on my remarks.”  
ibid. 
 
There was a substantive point Lesk was trying to make with the intended title where Ineffective 
was emphasised in a Wignerian context. Lesk had felt that: 
 “...biology lacks the magnificent compression of the physical sciences, where a small number of basic 
principles  allow  quantitative  prediction  of  many  observations  to  high  precision.  A  biologist 
confronted with a large body of inexplicable observations does not have faith that discovering the 
correct  mathematical  structure  will  make  sense  of  everything  by  exposing  the  hidden  underlying 
regularities. 
.... A famous physicist once dismissed my work, saying: ‘You're not doing science, you're just doing 




It is one of the illusions, enthusiastically maintained by mathematically competent economists, 
that economics is capable of a similar `magnificent compression' of its principles to `a small number 
of basic principles' that has led to the persistence faith in the application of the mathematical method 
in economics. Keynes famously thought `if economists could manage to get themselves thought of as 
humble, competent people, on a level with dentists, that would be splendid' (Keynes, 1930, p.373). I 
would happily settle for economics being compared to archaeology and our scientific activity placed 
on a level with that of the archaeologist. It would be a noble analogy. As a famous mathematician - 
who also made interesting contributions to analytical economics (Schwartz, 1961) – observed that the 
veneer of mathematics tends: 
 
“[T]o dress scientific brilliancies and scientific absurdities alike in the impressive uniform of formulae 
and  theorems.  Unfortunately  however,  an  absurdity  in  uniform  is  far  more  persuasive  than  an 
absurdity unclad.”  
Schwartz, 1986, p.22. 
 
The aim I have set forth for myself, in this essay, is to unclothe some of the uniforms of this 
empress, in her economic incarnations as a mathematical economist, and show her naked torso for 
what it is: ineffective and non-constructive in the strict technical sense of formal recursion theory and 
constructive mathematics; but also to try to unclothe a few of her generals and foot-soldiers and show 
them in their splendid, unclad, absurdities. Others have unclothed other elements of mathematical 
economics in related ways and it is also possible to tell a story in terms of Unreasonably Undecidable 
and  Incomplete  economic  theories
1.  In  particular,  the  impressive  works  by  what  I  may  call  the 
Brazilian School of Newton Costa, Francisco Doria and Marcelo Tsuji (da Costa and Doria, 1994, Tsuji, 
da Costa and Doria, 1998), a lifetime research program by Alain Lewis (aborted for various inexplicable 
reasons) and also recent work by Kislaya Prasad (2002) where, especially, the kind of questions I raise 
in  this  paper  are  raised  in  the  context  of  game  theory  and  its  underpinnings  in  aspects  of  Nash 
equilibria.
2  However,  to  keep  the  narrative  within  a  concise  scheme,  I  have  had  to  be  narrowly 
focused on a selected set of issues in this paper and, hence, have not harnessed the interesting results 
in works by these and other authors for the purpose of buttressing this story. 
Wigner's essay was admirably concise (only 16 pages long) and dealt with a host of vast and deep 
issues within that brief number of pages. It was divided into five subsections, in addition to a brief 
introduction.
3 I shall, to some extent, mimic that structure. Hence, the next section in this essay will 
try to summarise the salient points underlying alternative mathematical traditions. Wigner's brilliant 
lecture was delivered at a time when real analysis reigned supreme and formalism of one variety or 
another ruled, implicitly or explicitly.
4 
There  was,  if  not  universal  agreement,  blissful  ignorance  of  alternative  traditions  that  may  have 
provided  different  perspectives  on  the  formalized  natural  sciences.  Hence,  Wigner  could  happily 
confine his discussions on `What is Mathematics?' to just a page and a half!
5 Today such conciseness 
is almost impossible, even from the point of view of the knowledge of the mathematically minded 
economist. Classical real analysis is only one of at least four mathematical traditions within which 
economic questions can be formalized and discussed mathematically. Non-standard, constructive and computable analyses have been playing their own roles in the formalization and mathematization of 
economic entities - but mostly within the closure of neoclassical economic theory. 
Wigner's discussion of Physics and Physical theories are predicated upon the explicit and implicit 
fact that such theories have organising and disciplining criteria such as invariance, symmetry and 
conservation principles (cf. also Wigner, 1964 and McCauley, 2004). Lesk, on the other hand, by 
confining his discussion to that part of Molecular Biology which has come to be called Computational 
Molecular Biology, was able to single out the restraining and guiding hands provided by the laws of 
physics  and  chemistry,  without  subscribing  to  any  kind  of  reductionism.  He  coupled  these 
underpinnings to the mechanism of evolution and the role of chance in the latter, in particular, as 
organising  principles  to  demonstrate  the  effectivity  of  mathematical  theorising  in  Computational 
Molecular  Biology.  These  organising  principles  operate,  of  course,  also  in  Molecular  Biology  in 
general; it is just that, by concentrating on the computational subset, Lesk was able to characterize the 
canonical mathematical methods used as being sequence alignment and structure superposition. 
If I was to follow Lesk's strategy, then I have one of four possibilities. I can either work within the 
framework of General Equilibrium Theory (GET) as the core of neoclassical economics and choose 
its  computational  `subset',  i.e.,  Computable  General  Equilibrium  theory  (CGE)  and  discuss  the 
unreasonable effectiveness, or not, of mathematics inside these, narrow but well-defined citadels of 
application of mathematics in economics. The second possibility is to choose the computable subset 
of  either  GET  or  some  other  part  of  economic theory, not necessarily neoclassical in spirit, and 
highlight the effectivity of mathematical theorising in these subsets. The third alternative is to confine 
my attention to that amorphous practice, increasingly called Computational Economics, and discuss 
the effectivity of mathematical theorising in this field. I rule out the latter two alternatives in view of a 
lack of clearly defined disciplining criteria that would make it possible to provide a decent discussion 
within the confines of a single essay. The fourth alternative, that which appeals most to me, would be 
to work within the field of what I have come to call Computable Economics, but that would mean a 
discussion of the effectiveness of mathematics in economics, a story I have told elsewhere in greater 
detail  (Velupillai,  2000).  Therefore,  I  choose,  in  §3,  to  define  the  `economic  theory'  to  which 
mathematics has been applied ineffectively, and unreasonably so, as GET and confine myself to brief 
remarks on other, related areas of economics aspiring to the status of a mathematical discipline. 
I try, in §4 to suggest that we return to the tradition of the methodologies and epistemologies of 
the natural historian - perhaps, implicitly, also that of the dentist and the archaeologist. This final 
section is also a reflection of the way mathematics might develop and to speculate that the possible 
scenarios would reinforce the return of economics to what it once was: Political Arithmetic and to the 
fold of the enlightened national accountant. 
 
 
2. `For Poetry Makes Nothing Happen....'
6 - Mathematical Traditions. 
 
"Among the abstract arts music stands out by its precise and complex articulation, subject to a grammar 
of its own. In profundity and scope it may compare with pure mathematics. Moreover, both of these 
testify to the same paradox: namely that man can hold important discourse about nothing." 
Michael Polanyi: Personal Knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, p.193; italics added). 
 
 
If `Poetry Makes Nothing Happen', what, then, of philosophy and mathematics? Do they make 
anything happen? Surely, for them - and for poetry - to make anything happen, they have to be about 
something. What are they about, then? Michael Dummett's enlightened and informed criteria may 
offer a starting point
7:  
"The two most abstract of the intellectual disciplines, philosophy and mathematics, give rise to the same 
perplexity: what are they about? ..... 
An  uninformative  answer  could  be  given  by  listing  various  types  of  mathematical  object  and 
mathematical structure: mathematicians study the properties of natural numbers, real numbers, ordinal 
numbers, groups, topological spaces, differential manifolds, lattices and the like. ..... 
A  brilliant  answer  to  our  question  ..  was,  essentially,  that  mathematics  is  not  about  anything  in 
particular:  it  consists,  rather,  of  the  systematic  construction  of  complex  deductive  arguments. 
Deductive reasoning is capable of eliciting, from comparatively meagre premisses and by routes far 
from immediately obvious, a wealth of often surprising consequences; in mathematics such routes are 
explored  and  the  means  of  deriving  those  consequences  are  stored  for  future  use  in  the  form  of 
propositions.  Mathematical  theorems,  on  this  account,  embody  deductive  subroutines  which,  once 
discovered, can be repeatedly used in a variety of contexts."  
Dummett, 1994, pp.11-14; bold emphasis added. 
 
In  other  words,  mathematics  is  about  proof.  I  believe  this  to  be  a  valid  and  standard 
characterisation which helps delineate the different `schools' of mathematics in terms of it. Some 
`routes' for the `construction of complex deductive arguments' are aesthetically more acceptable, on 
clearly defined criteria, to one class of mathematicians and others to another class and this is one of 
the ways these different `schools' have tried to distinguish themselves from each other. As one may 
expect,  different  `routes'  may  lead  the  traveller  to  different  destinations  -  to  different  classes  of 
mathematical  objects  and,  equally,  different  classes  of  mathematicians  have  approved  -  and 
disapproved,  as  the  case  may  be  - for aesthetic and epistemological reasons, as valid or invalid, 
alternative structures of `deductive arguments'. In other words, there is no such thing as universally 
valid and acceptable class of `deductive arguments' that must exclusively be used in the exploratory 
journeys along `far from immediately obvious routes'. Many times, the `routes' are discovered; at 
other  times,  they  are  invented.  A  whole,  respectable  and  resilient,  mathematical  movement, 
methodologically and epistemologically rigorous in its ways, has always claimed that there are no 
`routes' out there, laid out by the Gods, for mathematicians to discover. Mathematicians, equipped 
with a stock of ideas, explore alternative `routes' with aesthetically and epistemologically acceptable 
deductive structures - i.e., construction rules - and create - i.e., invent - new pathways that lead to 
unexpected destinations. Others live in a world of Platonic shadows and discover routes that have 
been laid out by the Gods.
8 The former are called the Intuitionists; the latter are the formal Platonists. 
These  two  classes  do  not,  of  course,  exhaust  the  class  of  mathematicians;  there  are  varieties  of 
Platonists  and,  equally,  varieties  of  Intuitionists,  and  others  besides:  Hilbertian  Formalists, 
Bourbakists, Bishop-style Constructivists, Logicists, and so on. A flavour of the main differences, 
based  on  the  Dummett-Hardy  characterisation  of  mathematics  and  the  mathematician,  can  be 





    ME: ‘  I have just proved $ x s.t A.’ 
    I:     ‘Congratulations. What is it? How did you prove it?’ 
    ME:   ‘It is an economic equilibrium. I assumed " x ¬A and derived a contradiction.’ 
    I:     ‘Oh! You mean you `proved' ¬" x¬A?’ 
    ME:   ‘That's what I thought I said.’ 
    I:     ‘I don't think so.’ 
 
 
 Example 2 
 ME:   ‘I have proved A∨B.’ 
 I:     ‘Excellent. Which did you prove?’ 
 ME:   ‘What?’ 
 I:     ‘You said you had proved A or B and I was wondering whether you had proved A or B, or 
both.’ 
 ME:   ‘None of them! I assumed ¬A∧¬B and derived a contradiction.’ 
 I:     ‘Oh, you mean you proved ¬[¬A∧¬B]?’ 
 ME:   ‘That's right. Your way of stating it is simply another way of saying the same thing.’ 
 I:      ‘No - not at all.’ 
 
As a direct instance of the first example, with immediate implications for the foundations of GET, 
there is the case of Brouwer's original proof of his celebrated fix point theorem. He - and legions of 
others after him, scores of who were economists - did not prove that `every f (in a certain class of 
functions) has a fixed point' (i.e.,$ x s.t A) . What he did prove was: `There is no f (in a certain class 
of functions) without a fixed point' (i.e., ¬" x ¬A). The equivalence between the two propositions 
entails an acceptance of the deductive validity of: ¬(¬A)ñA. Brouwer himself came to reject the 
validity of this principle and, forty years after the initial publication of his famous result, reformulated 
the proof without reliance on it (Brouwer, 1952). 
The  second  example  illustrates  a  widely used non-constructive principle, most conspicuously 
utilised  in  the  'proof'  of  the  Bolzano-Weierstrass  Theorem  (Dummett,  1977,  pp.10-11),  which  is 
implicitly  assumed  in  all  `constructions'  of  equilibria  in  CGE  models.  The  reason  for  some 
mathematicians to object to proofs of the sort in the second example is that it shows that one or the 
other of two specific conditions hold without specifying a means to determine which of them is valid 
in  any  specific  set  of  circumstance.  It  is  as  if  the  mathematician  in  his  journey  along  those 
characterising  `routes'  comes  to  a  fork  in  the  pathway  and  is  told  that  one  or  the  other  of  the 
alternatives will lead to a specified destination, but is not given any further information as to which 
one might do so. Is she to take both, simultaneously or one after the other - even along mathematical 
pathways  that  are  routinely  non-finite, as, indeed, the case in the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem? 
What are the consequences of traversing an infinite path, speckled with forks, where undecidable 
disjunctions can paralyse progress? The classical mathematician is not troubled by such conundrums; 
almost all other traditions tame undecidable disjunctions at their buds. The mathematical economist 
and almost all applications of mathematics in economics traverse with princely unconcern for the 
forks, donning the proverbial blind every time such bifurcations are encountered. No wonder, then, 
that  the  subject  remains  entwined  and  entangled  in  numerical  indeterminacies  and  logical 
undecidabilities - but this is an item for the next section. 
In the above explicit instance of the first example I have invoked the idea of a function without 
trying  to  define  its  meaning.  So,  what  is  a  function?
10  How  do  different  mathematical  traditions 
confront  the  task  of  answering  this  question?  The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  word  `function'  is 
associated with the `idea' of performing a task. All mathematical traditions, with the notable exception 
of what, for want of a better name, I shall call `classical real analysis' or `classical mathematics', each 
in their own way, retain fidelity to the ordinary meaning of the word `function' in their specialised 
characterisations. Historically, in mathematics, the meaning of the concept was intimately tied to the 
notion of a rule, a procedure, a set of instructions to perform a task. Thus, for example, a function f 
was  supposed  to  enable  a  mathematician  to  calculate,  given  a  number,  say  x,  -  real,  natural,  or 
whatever - another number, denoted by f(x) such that, whenever x=y, then f(x)=f(y). This was to 
impose some disciplining criteria in the procedures - the methods by which patterns are created. 




A function f:A→B is any subset fŒ(AµB) which satisfies: (∀xœA)($yœB) s.t (x,y)œf&(x,y′)œfﬂy=y′. 
 
However,  this  definition  -  `function  as  a  graph'  -  makes  sense  only  within  set  theory
12.  The 
definition has severed all connections with the meaning attributed to the word `function' in ordinary 
discourse; there is little sense in which it can be understood to `perform a task'. The idea of a `rule', a 
`procedure', encapsulated within the historical definition of the idea - concept - of a `function' has 
disappeared. This is best illustrated by an example (cf. Moschovakis, 1994, p.41). The following 
`formulas'  for  computing  the  square  of  two  numbers,  defined  on  the  reals,  are  equivalent  in  the 
`function as a graph' definition implied by the above Dirichlet-Kuratowski characterization:  
 
2 ( , ) ( ) f x y x y º +  
2 2 ( , ) 2 g x y x xy y º + +  
 
As tasks to be performed, say on a digital computer via a simple program, they result in different 
sets  of  instructions.  The  key  point  is  this:  whether  the  notion  of  a  function  that  is  based  on 
`performing a task' can be represented in set theory in such a way as to capture its full intuitive 
content remains an open question. In spite of this indeterminacy, mathematical economists - and, so 
far as I know, all economists who apply mathematics in economics - routinely rely on this particular 
definition for their so-called rigorous notion of a function. 
On the other hand, almost all other traditions, as mentioned above, in their definitions of the 
notion of a function, retain fidelity with the ordinary meaning and mathematical tradition. Thus, in 
Bishop style constructive mathematics the distinguishing starting point is that all existence proofs 
should be constructive in the precise sense that every proof can be implemented, in principle, as an 
algorithm in a computer
 to demonstrate, by explicit construction, the object in question. This means, 
firstly, that the law of the excluded middle
 (tertium non datur) is not invoked in infinitary cases; 
secondly, as a by-product of such a discipline on existence as construction, all functions are required 
to be uniformly continuous in each closed interval. In other words, if mathematics is about proving 
theorems, and if proofs are to be constructive - i.e., performable tasks, at least in principle, by a set of 
explicit  instructions  -  then  each  function  must  be  characterized  in  a  certain  precise  way.  Hence, 
Bishop-style constructive mathematics retains fidelity with the ordinary meaning of the concept of 
function by endowing it with certain mathematical properties - i.e., uniformly continuous in each 
closed interval - such that when they are used in the pattern formation activities of the mathematician 
they will facilitate the `performance of tasks'. 
In that variant of constructive mathematics known as Brouwerian Intuitionism, the starting point 
is what is known as `free choice sequences' - where a rule for determining a real number is a result of 
free choices by an autonomous human intelligence, independent of the strictures of the undecidable 
disjunctions of classical logic. This implied, in Brouwerian Intuitionism, that all functions from reals 
to reals are continuous. Here, too, starting from a metatheoretic assumption - construction of the 
primitives by `free choice sequences', based on what Brouwer considered was the domain of activity 
of the mathematician - his or her autonomous intelligence - one was led to consider a characterisation 
of functions that retained fidelity with tradition and the ordinary meaning of the word. 
Then, there is the class of computable functions, the domain of the recursion theorist, acting under 
the discipline of the Church Turing Thesis. The most direct way of describing or characterising these 
functions - although not the mode that I find most congenial - is to say that they are that subset of the 
functions defined in classical mathematics which can be implemented on an ideal digital computer - 
i.e., the Turing Machine. Next, invoking the Church-Turing Thesis, one identifies them, depending on the aims of the analysis, as the class of partial recursive functions or Church's l definable functions, 
etc. Then, by way of elementary counting arguments it is shown that there are `only' a countable 
infinity of Turing Machines and, hence, also of partial recursive functions, implying thereby that the 
complement of this set in the class of all classically defined functions contains the uncomputable 
functions.  They  are,  therefore,  uncountably  infinite  in  number!  This,  by  the  way,  is the class of 
functions routinely used and assumed in mathematical economics of every variety, without exception. 
It is, of course, possible to continue a finer classification of varieties of constructive mathematics 
and, also, varieties of Formalists, Platonists, and Logicists and so on
13. However, this will achieve no 
particular  purpose  beyond  that  which  has  been  achieved  with  the  above  few  considerations  and 
characterisations  for  the  following  reasons.  Given  the  Hardy-Dummett  characterisation  of 
mathematics and the activity of the mathematician in terms of `the systematic construction of complex 
deductive arguments', it was inevitable that there would be some dissonance in the meaning and 
interpretation to be attached to `construction' and the acceptability or not of valid deductive rules for 
the `construction'. Depending on the kind of deductive rules and constructions accepted as valid, there 
are different ways to characterise mathematics and mathematicians. I have highlighted a few of the 
possible ways to do this - but many other ways could have been attempted with equal ease, which 
would have resulted in a many-splendoured world of possible mathematics and mathematicians. The 
main point to note is that it is not a monolithic world, characterised by one concept of `proof' and a 
single way of `constructing patterns' from an inflexibly determined set of deductive rules. 
 
 
3. A Glittering Deception of Entrappers & Entrapped
14 
 
"And he wondered what the artist had intended to represent (Watt knew nothing about painting), ... a 
circle and a centre not its centre in search of a centre and its circle respectively, in boundless space, in 
endless time (Watt knew nothing about physics) ...  ." 
Samuel Beckett: Watt (Beckett, 1963, p.127); italics added. 
 
Given the availability of a variety of mathematical structures that could have been harnessed for 
the formalization of economic theory, why and how did economists choose the one formalism that 
was most conspicuously devoid of numerical content
15? This question, to be answered, requires a 
detailed  historical  study  of  source  material  in  disciplined  ways,  and  is,  in  any  case,  outside  the 
particular scope of this paper. What is, however, clear beyond any doubt is the crucial role played by 
existence proofs in the modern mathematization of economic theory. To this may be added also the 
role of separating hyperplane theorems, in view of the importance of optimization as a disciplining 
criterion in economic analysis. I shall, therefore, for the purposes of the discussion in this paper have 
these two issues in mind although, paradoxically, the latter - separating hyperplane theorems - is less 
crucial in a formal sense than the former - fixed point theorems. At the very outset I would like to 
make  it  very  clear  that,  contrary  to  widespread  and  popular  belief  that  topological  fixed  point 
theorems  are  the  only  way  to  formalize  economic  equilibrium  existence  problems,  this  is 
demonstrably  false.  By  `demonstrably  false'  I  mean  the  following:  it  is  easy  to  formalize, 
constructively or recursion theoretically, the fundamentals of economic theory - rational agents and 
their choice behaviour - and seek equilibria using perfectly valid constructive or computable fixed 
point theorems. For example, at a most basic level, the problem of formalizing rational expectations, 
showing  its  existence  and  deriving  a  learning  scheme  to  achieve  it  can  all  be  framed  recursion 
theoretically and constructively (cf. Velupillai, 2004). 
In their seminal textbook on mathematical economics, Arrow and Hahn (1971) state that their 
`methods  of  proof  are  in  a  number  of  instances  quite  different'  from  those  in  Debreu's  classic, 
codifying, text on the Theory of Value (Debreu, 1959). Debreu, in turn, claimed that he was treating the theory of value, in his book, `with the standards of rigor of the contemporary formalist school of 
mathematics' and that this `effort toward rigor substitutes correct reasonings and results for incorrect 
ones' (ibid, p.viii). But we are not told, by Arrow and Hahn or by Debreu, either what these `different 
methods of proof' mean in the form of new insights into economics (or mathematics) or which concept 
of `rigor' underpins the substitution of `correct reasonings and results for incorrect ones'. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  crowning  achievement  of  the  Arrow-Debreu  reformulation  of  the 
Walrasian problem of the existence of economic (exchange) equilibrium was its formal demonstration 
as the solution to a fixed point problem. In addition to this, there was the harnessing of theorems of 
the separating hyperplane - more generally, the Hahn-Banach Theorem and Duality Theorems - to 
formally  demonstrate  the  mathematical  validity  of  the  two  fundamental  theorems  of  welfare 
economics. Thus, existence of economic equilibrium and welfare economics were given so-called 
rigorous mathematical formulations and formal demonstrations as theorems of various sorts. Both 
Arrow and Debreu were handsome in their acknowledgement of debts to the trails that had been 
blazed by the pioneers in mathematical method for such issues: von Neumann, Wald and Nash being 
the most prominent among them, but also numerous mathematicians - Brouwer, Kakutani and Banach, 
to name the obvious ones. 
As a sequel to the codification achieved by Debreu, Scarf began a sustained research program to 
`effectivize' and `constructivise' one aspect of the mathematics of general equilibrium theory: the 
problem of existence. Early on, he had realised that proving existence by non-constructive means was 
unsatisfactory from the point of view of economics as an applied subject, even apart from possible 
aesthetic motivations and intellectual challenges to constructivise non-numerical concepts. This is the 
research  program  under  the  rubric  of  Computable  General  Equilibrium  theory  (CGE),  with  far 
reaching  policy  implications.  Surprisingly,  no  one  has  tried  to  constructivise  or  effectivize  the 
formalizations of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, on which momentous policy 
prescriptions - even of a philosophical nature - depend. 
The main question I wish to pose in this section is the following: suppose the modern masters of 
mathematical general equilibrium theory had been more enlightened in their attitude and, possibly, 
knowledge of mathematics and its philosophy, ontology and epistemology, and had they taken the 
trouble  to  `treat  the  theory  of  value  with  the  standards  of  rigour  of'  not  only  `the  contemporary 
formalist school of mathematics', but with the `standards of rigour' of other contemporary schools of 
mathematics, how much of their economic propositions would remain valid? In other words, did the 
successes of the Theory of Value depend on the fortuitous fact of having been formalised in terms of 
`the contemporary formalist school of mathematics'? 
A subsidiary question I pose, next, is whether Scarf's program can be carried through successfully. 
The claim, by leading applied economists, is that it has been carried through successfully and GET is, 
now, an eminently applicable field, with clear computational and numerical content. 
My  answer  to  the  first  question  is  that  the  results  are  decisively  sensitive  to  the  kind  of 
mathematics used. The answer to the second question is that the Scarf program cannot succeed in its 
aim to constructivise the equilibrium existence problem of GET, i.e, the constructive and computable 
content of CGE is vacuous. 
Before I consider the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematical general equilibrium theory, 
there are a few ghosts to rekindle, a phantom to resurrect and some to lay to rest. The first ghost that 
deserves a rekindling is the existence problem - and from two points of view. Firstly, is it really 
necessary  to  pose,  as  a  mathematical,  problem,  the  question  of  equilibrium  existence  in  formal 
economic theory? Hicks, arguably the doyen of economic theory for the 20th century, did not think 
so: 
 
"[T]he  [Value  and  Capital]  model  is  not  much  affected  by  the  criticism,  made  against  it  by  some 
mathematical economists, that the existence of an equilibrium, at positive prices, is not demonstrated. ..... Existence, from my point of view, was a part of the hypothesis: I was asking, if such a system 
existed, how would it work?" 
Hicks, 1983, p.374; italics added. 
 
With an eye at some questions to be raised below, let me ask
16: why `at positive prices' and not `at 
positive integer or rational prices'? 
Next, even if there is a satisfactory answer to the first question - in spite of the weight of Hicks' 
vision and stand - was it necessary to formulate the equilibrium existence problem as a fix point 
problem? Smale did not think so: 
 
"We return to the subject of equilibrium theory. The existence theory of the static approach is deeply 
rooted to the use of the mathematics of fixed point theory. Thus one step in the liberation from the static 
point of view would be to use a mathematics of a different kind. Furthermore, proofs of fixed point 
theorems traditionally use difficult ideas of algebraic topology, and this has obscured the economic 
phenomena  underlying  the  existence  of  equilibria.  Also  the economic equilibrium problem presents 
itself most directly and with the most tradition not as a fixed point problem, but as an equation, supply 
equals demand. Mathematical economists have translated the problem of solving this equation into 
a fixed point problem. 
I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems in the theory of economic equilibrium, one 
can now bypass the fixed point approach and attack the equations directly to give existence of 
solutions, with a simpler kind of mathematics and even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic 
overtones." 
Smale, 1976, p.290; bold emphasis added. 
 
A phantom to resurrect, in this connection, especially in the context of the forum for which this 
essay was prepared, is that a supreme example of equation systems that were solved without recourse 
to any kind of fixed point theorem, were those presented by Piero Sraffa (Sraffa, 1960).  Of course, 
the  Sraffa  systems  were  not  of  the  supply=demand  variety;  nevertheless,  they  were  equilibrium 
systems of a sort. That legions of mathematical economists, both well-meaning and hostile, spent time 
and effort to re-prove what had been proved quite adequately, although not by formalistic means, 
remains an unfathomable mystery to me. It was as if no one could understand simple, constructive 
proofs  or,  worse,  that  even  mathematically  competent  readers  were  one-dimensional  in  their 
knowledge  of  techniques  of  proofs.  Why  someone  did  not  use  Sraffa's  perfectly  adequate  and 
competent methods to re-prove, say, the Perron-Frobenius theorem, and free it from the shackles of 
reliance on the non-constructive Brouwer fixed point theorem is also a mystery to me. Kurz and 
Salvadori  (2001)  make  this  point,  but  remain,  unfortunately,  shackled  within  the  prisons  of  real 
analysis  and,  hence,  their  alleged  ‘algorithm’,  however  well-meaning,  is  unimplementable  (ibid, 
p.206). The precise reason is, in view of Specker’s Theorem in Computable Analysis (cf. Theorem 1, 
below), their appeal to the classic theorem of real analysis, where a bounded monotone sequence 
converges,  is  invalid  in  algorithmic  analysis.  Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  from  their  sympathetic 
discussion whether they refer to algorithms in the sense of constructive or computable analysis. This 
is an example, also, of how entrenched traditional mathematical and logical habits are, among even 
well-meaning mathematical economists, and extracting the non-numerical and non-effective content 
of unguarded propositions is both tedious and arduous. Sraffa, in the main part of his book, did not 
invoke or use any non-algorithmic method of analysis in demonstrating his propositions. I developed 
some  aspects  of  these  themes  and  the  attendant  difficulties  a  long  time  ago  (cf.  for  example, 
Velupillai, 1989 and references cited therein), but had no success in eliciting any interest, favourable 
or otherwise. 
Why, then, did mathematical economists translate the problem of solving equations `into a fixed 
point  problem'  of  proving  the  existence  of  a  solution?  Also,  suppose we return to the ‘equation' 
tradition but impose natural economic constraints on the variables, parameters and constants of the supply-demand relations. Such natural constraints would imply integer and rational valued variables, 
constants and parameters. To return to a variant of the question I posed just after the Hicks quote: why 
the fetishism of looking for `non-negative prices' in an equilibrium configuration? Surely, a return to 
the  equation  tradition,  with  non-negative  integer  or  rational  valued  variables,  constants  and 
parameters means a confrontation with a combinatorial monster: Diophantine equation. In such an 
environment, the economic problem would naturally become a (recursion-theoretic) decision problem 
and will no longer be a traditional optimization problem. 
Let me, now, return to GET and CGE and their mathematically unreasonable ineffectiveness. 
Here  I  shall  mean,  by  ineffectiveness,  the  strict  technical  sense  of  being  uncomputable  or  non-
constructive. The caveat unreasonable signifies the fact that the mathematics used - i.e., methods of 
proof utilized in GET and CGE - and the axioms assumed - were not only economically injudicious 
but also unnecessary and irrelevant from every conceivable numerical and computational point of 
view. 
The formal underpinnings of the economic theory enunciated in Debreu's Theory of Value depend 
crucially on the following mathematical axiom, concepts and theorems
17: 
1.  The axiom of completeness ( §1.5.d, p.10); 
2.  Compactness (§1.6.t, p.15) ; 
3.  (Topologically characterized) Continuity (§1.7.b, p.15); 
4.  The maximum-minimum theorem or, as Debreu has named it, the Weierstrass theorem (§1.7.h 
(4'), p.16); 
5.  The separating hyperplane theorems (§1.9, pp.24-5); 
6.  The Brouwer and Kakutani Fixed Point Theorems (§1.10, p.26); 
Let  me,  now,  add,  to  this  mathematical  apparatus  in  the  Theory  of  Value,  the  following  six 
theorems, propositions and facts: 
 
Theorem 1: Specker's Theorem in Computable Analysis 
A sequence exists with an upper bound but without a least upper bound. 
 
Proposition 1: The Heine-Borel Theorem (Compactness) is invalid in Computable Analysis. 
 
Claim  1:  There  are  `clear  intuitive  notions  of  continuity  which  cannot  be  topologically  defined' 
(Gandy, 1995, p.73). 
 
Proposition 2: The Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem is invalid in Constructive Mathematics. 
 
Claim 2: The Hahn-Banach Theorem is invalid in its classical form in Constructive and Computable 
analysis. 
 
Claim 3: The fixed point theorems in their classical versions are not valid in (Intuitionistically) 
Constructive Mathematics. 
 
If the above theorem, propositions and claims are appended to the Theory of Value, or to any later 
`edition'  of  it  such  as  Arrow-Hahn  (1971),  then  it  can  be  shown  that  none  of  the  propositions, 
theorems and claims of a mathematical sort would retain their validity without drastic modifications 
of their economic content and implications. In particular, not a single formal proposition in the Theory 
of Value would have any numerical or computational content
18. 
Suppose we add, to the above six supplementary `riders', the following Claim on the Uzawa 
Equivalence Theorem (Uzawa, 1962): 
 Claim 4: The Uzawa Equivalence Theorem is neither constructively nor computably valid. 
 
Then,  in  conjunction with the invalidity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem (Proposition 2, 
above),  Claim  4  implies  that  the  constructive  content  of  CGE  models,  and  their  computational 
implications for economic policy analysis, are vacuous. 
A  similar  exercise  can  be  carried  out  for  every  sub-field  of  economic  theory  to  which  the 
mathematical method has been applied - in particular, game theory. It will be a tedious exercise but I 
suspect that, eventually, such an exegesis can even be automated! The general strategy would be to 
identify the key mathematical axioms, theorems and concepts that underlie any particular mathematics 
applied to a sub-field of economic theory and, then, to investigate their constructive, computable, non-
standard or real analytic nature. Thus, for example, a seemingly innocuous application of dynamical 
systems theory in endogenous theories of the business cycle would also be susceptible to such an 
exegetic  exercise.  Any  use  of  the  Cauchy-Peano  theorem  in  the  existence  theory  for  differential 
equations  will  fall  foul  of  the  failure  of  the  validity  of  the  Bolzano-Weierstrass  Theorem  in 
Constructive  mathematics.  This  is  because  the  Bolzano-Weierstrass  Theorem  is  equivalent to the 
Ascoli Lemma which, in turn, is used to simplify the proof of the Cauchy-Peano Theorem. 
In passing, it must, of course, be pointed out that fixed point theorems did not enter economic 
analysis by way of the existence problem of general equilibrium theory; the entrance points were 
game theory and growth theory - both at the hands of von Neumann. For reasons of space, my remarks 
on these two issues will have to be brief. First of all, as regards game theory, I have already tried to 
make a case for recasting every game theoretic problem in economics as an Arithmetical Game (cf. 
Velupillai,  2000,  ch.7).  This  implies  that  their  solutions  can  be  reduced  to  Diophantine  decision 
problems, in analogy with the equation approach to the economic equilibrium existence problem. 
Secondly, in the case of growth theory, the original fixed point problem of a minimax system was 
`simplified' into a separating hyperplane problem. But as pointed out above, the separating hyperplane 
theorem, or the Hahn-Banach theorem, has neither an exact equivalent formulation in constructive 
mathematics nor is it known, at present, whether it is valid in computable analysis (cf. for example 
Metakides and Nerode, 1982). However, the fact remains that growth theory is a problem of self-
reproduction and self-reconstruction, and to that extent the theory can felicitously be reformulated as 
a recursion theoretic problem and the standard, numerically implementable, fixed point theorem of 
recursion theory can be applied. 
What kind of lessons are we to draw from this particular exercise in exegesis? There is almost no 
better  way  to  phrase  the  main  lesson  to  be  drawn  than  in  the  words  of  a  leading  mathematical 
macroeconomist: 
 
"..  [A]s  economic  analysts  we  are  directed  by,  if  not  prisoners  of,  the  mathematical  tools  that  we 
possess." 
Sargent, 1987, p.xix; italics added. 
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"Mathematics is not a finished object based on some axioms. It evolves genetically. This has not yet 
quite come to conscious realization. ... 
[T]here might someday be entirely new points of view, even about sets or classes of sets. Sets may 
someday  be  considered  as  `imaginary.'  I  think  that  will  come  to  pass,  though  at  present  it  is  not 
admissible. Mathematics will change. Instead of precise theorems, of which there are now millions, we will have, 
fifty years from now, general theories and vague guidelines, and the individual proofs will be worked 
out by graduate students or by computers. 
Mathematicians fool themselves when they think that the purpose of mathematics is to prove theorems, 
without regard to the broader impact of mathematical results. Isn't it strange? 
In the next fifty years there will be, if not axioms, at least agreements among mathematicians about 
assumptions of new freedoms of constructions, of thoughts. Given an undecidable proposition, there will 
be a preference as to whether one should assume it to be true or false. Iterated this becomes: some 
statements may be undecidably undecidable. This has great philosophical interest." 
Ulam (Cooper, 1989, pp. 310-2); italics added. 
 
Ulam was always a prescient mathematician. In an almost uncannily eerie confirmation of his 
broad prediction, Stephen Wolfram’s much heralded, widely discussed, somewhat controversial New 
Kind of Science (Wolfram, 2002; henceforth, NKS) has set out an implementable version and vision of 
the  kind  of  mathematics  that  may  have  been  in  Ulam’s  mind
20.  It  is  also  appropriate  because 
Wolfram’s instrument to implement the vision is a particular construction which Ulam (together with 
von  Neumann)  pioneered:  the  Cellular  Automaton.  Wolfram’s  broad  philosophical  stance  on  the 
nature and evolution of mathematics buttresses my own vision and, in many ways, is a variant of 
Ulam’s as I have (admittedly selectively) summarised above: 
 
“..like most other fields of human enquiry mathematics has tended to define itself to be concerned with 
just those questions that its methods can successfully address. And since the main methods traditionally 
used  in  mathematics  have  revolved  around  doing  proofs,  questions  that  involve  undecidability  and 
unprovability have inevitably been avoided.  …. 
The main point  ..  is that in both the systems it studies and the questions it asks mathematics is much 
more a product of its history than is realized.” 
ibid, p.792. 
 
If economics is formalized using traditional mathematics, then, naturally, it will be crippled or 
enhanced by the poverty or richness of the history that determines the latter, as the natural sciences 
have been, a point emphasised by Ulam and Wolfram; but also, the extent to which ‘mathematics has 
tended to define itself to be concerned with just those questions that its methods can successfully 
address’, will distort the economic theory that is formalized using that particular kind of mathematics. 
I have tried, within the limited span of the previous sections, to make clearer than is traditionally done 
in mathematical economics, the traditionally invoked methods of mathematics and their limitations 
(and, to some extent their historically evolved nature). Much more can, of course, can be said and 
discussed about these aspects but it is satisfying to find my interpretations echoed in the stances taken 
by Ulam and Wolfram. 
The place and kind of mathematical principles and practice I envisage, in an economics for the 
future,  outlined  below  and,  partly,  implicit  in  the  way  ineffectivity  of  standard  mathematical 
economics was discussed above, is such that it will be perfectly sensible and practicable to consider it 
a particular implementation of the message in NKS, especially as developed in chapter 11: The Notion 
of Computation and chapter 12: The Principle of Computational Equivalence (ibid).  
If I might try to compress the essential methodological message in NKS, for the purpose of a brief 
justification of the feasibility of the embedding mentioned in the footnote above, then it would be 
something like the following. On the basis of a mathematical philosophy of the formal meaning of 
computation, underpinned by recursion theory, Wolfram fundamental ontological assumption, in an 
almost (early) Wittgensteinian way, is that everything is to be viewed as a process or as the realization 
of a process and (ibid, p.715): 
 All processes can be viewed as computations 
 
With this as his basic epistemological vision, he enunciates the basic principle of NKS to be The 
Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE), (ibid, pp. 716-7): 
 
Almost  all  processes  that  are  not  obviously  simple  can  be  viewed  as  computations  of 
equivalent structure 
 
To  give  methodological  content  to  the  idea  of  computations  of  equivalent  structure  in  this 
principle he invokes the notion of computation universality, borrowed from recursion theory, suitably 
modified, but leaves the notion of ‘not obviously simple’ incompletely formalized, but not hanging by 
the  proverbial  bootstraps.  From  PCE  he  derives,  as  a  consequence,  what  is  best  viewed  as  a 
Phenomenological Law, such as those commonly enunciated in phenomenological thermodynamics: 
Computational Irreducibility.  
The above, in a nutshell, summarizes the ontology, epistemology and methodology underpinning 
NKS. Essentially, computational irreducibility of a process, by PCE, implies unpredictability. He is 
then able to show that traditional science is, basically, computationally reducible and, hence, can 
succeed in local predictability. This is because the mathematical laws that encapsulate traditional 
science are simple enough to be analytically solvable and, hence, are computationally reducible.  
In other words, he extracts the implicit processes intrinsic to or implied by any mathematical law 
or formalism and uses his PCE, and its phenomenological consequence, computational irreducibility 
to evaluate their effective and predictable content to show the simplistic, unrealistic and undesirable 
nature of mathematical formalisms in traditional science. However, his message can be read as a way 
of showing the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in traditional science. This is because, his 
aim is to show that the appearance of the success of traditional science, using the criteria of simplicity 
in the laws that encapsulate the phenomena to be explained and the predictions that are extracted from 
them,  is  due  to  a  subterfuge:  that  of  concentrating  on  using  analytically  solvable  mathematical 
formalisms to encapsulate natural laws and thereby ignoring the processes that have to be used to 
evaluate  the  solution  to  any  such formalism. In this way, the methodology of traditional science 
circumvented the implications of computational irreducibility and, hence, ignored PCE. 
The  exercise  I  have  attempted  in  the  previous  sections  is  very  similar to Wolfram’s broader 
agenda and can be embedded within his scheme – if I were to accept his ontology. I am not entirely 
sure  I  can,  at  this  juncture,  subscribe  to  it  or  to  its  underpinnings.  I  do  not  confine  myself  to 
algorithms  or  computations  in  a  strictly  recursion  theoretic  way;  I  have  left  the  door  open  to 
constructive mathematics and, hence, to algorithms – computational processes – that are not subject to 
the Church-Turing thesis and to the possibility of relying on intuitionistic logic. However, I am nor 
unhappy not unwilling to embrace his methodology and epistemology; indeed, I have done so quite 
willingly in my other writings, except that I base myself on a minor variant of his computational 
irreducibility, known in algorithmic complexity theory as incompressibility. Further excursions into 
these issues will complicate and expand this paper and its message beyond reason and space and I 
must leave it for a different exercise (cf. Albin, Foley and Velupillai, 2004).  
To return, now, to the themes of the previous section it is surely true that, more than any other 
single  factor,  it  is  the  obsession  with  the  existence  problem  that  seems  to  have  condemned 
mathematical economics to ineffectivity. But this is not as serious a problem for the mathematization 
of economic theory in an effective mode as it might appear at first sight. Though it may require hard 
work - in the sense of having to re-learn alternative mathematical paradigms - it is not, intrinsically an 
impossible task. Nor will the knowledge and traditions gained in training ourselves to think formally 
and formalise routinely go to waste. It is almost a routine task to formalize economic theory recursion 
theoretically or constructively and to highlight its natural quantitative underpinnings explicitly.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  for  nothing  that  the  great  master  of  modern  economic  theory, 
sometimes even in its mathematical mode, John Hicks, never tired of emphasising the importance of 
the accounting tradition in economic analysis, particularly dynamic economics: 
 
"In  all  its  main  forms,  modern  economic  dynamics  is  an  accounting  theory.  It  borrows  its  leading 
concepts from the work which had previously been done by accountants (with singularly little help from 
economists);  and  it  is  in  accordance  with  this  that  social  accounting  should  be  its  main  practical 
instrument of application." 
Hicks, 1956, p. 221. 
 
Somewhere between the Political Arithmetician, alias the National Income Accountant, and the 
Financial Analyst, alias the Accountant, lies the task of the quantitative economist's analytical role 
and none of the theoretical or applied tasks of these two pragmatic and paradigmatic figures requires 
anything more than arithmetic, statistics and the rules of compound interest. These, in turn, require 
nothing more than an understanding of the conditions under which systems of equations can and 
cannot be solved. But what kind of quantities do these equations encapsulate as parameters, constants 
and variables?
21 Surely, the kind of quantities that enter the equations of the Political Arithmetician 
and the Accountant cannot be other than rational or natural numbers - negative and non-negative?
22. 
Eminent theorists, working in core areas of economic theory – price theory and monetary theory – 
have made this point in interesting ways over the past half a century (Gomory and Baumol, 1960, 
Clower & Howitt, 1978 and Scarf, 1990).  
For example, in one of the most fundamentally innovative discussions on a core area of monetary 
economics, Clower and Howitt remarked that a realistic analysis of the Transactions Theory of the 
Demand for Money implied the use of proof techniques involving `the use of number theory - a branch 
of  mathematics  unfamiliar  to  most  economists'  (ibid,  p.452,  footnote  3).  The  reason  such  proof 
techniques  had  to  be  used  was  that  they  imposed  simple,  realistic,  constraints  on  the  domain  of 
analysis – integer units. Their starting point was that individual traders produce, sell and purchase only 
discrete, integer, units of one stock-flow good - the obvious and natural place to begin. Once this is 
done, the economic problem automatically becomes a Diophantine decision problem, although the 
unwary  reader  may  not  immediately  recognise  this  aspect  when  they  are  formulated  as  integer 
programming  problems  (as  in  Scarf,  op.cit).  But  in  a  classic  paper  on  a  traditional  problem  in 
economic theory, pricing, Gomory and Baumol made the connection between integer programming 
and Diophantine problems right at the outset: 
 
“A surprisingly wide range of problems including Diophantine problems …. can be given an integer 
programming formulation.” 
ibid, p.521; italics added 
 
Why these hints, implorations and suggestions were not taken more seriously in the practice and 
teaching of economic analysis, I do not know; perhaps inertia is the simplest explanation. In any case, 
I cannot see any role for real numbers in quantitative economics and, hence, none whatsoever for real 
analysis  and  the  proof  techniques  allied  to  it.  Richard  Hamming  wondered,  similarly,  about  the 
appropriate kind of numbers for probability theory
23: 
 
"Thus without further examination it is not completely evident that the classical real number system will 
prove to be appropriate to the needs of probability. Perhaps the real number system is: (1) not rich 
enough - see non-standard analysis; (2) just what we want - see standard mathematics; or (3) more than 
is needed - see constructive mathematics, and computable numbers. ... 
What are all these uncountably many non-computable numbers that the conventional real number system 
includes?.... The intuitionists, of whom you seldom hear about in the process of getting a classical mathematical 
education, have long been articulate about the troubles that arise in the standard mathematics .... 
What are we to think of this situation? What is the role in probability theory for these numbers which 
can never occur in practice?" 
Hamming, 199, pp. 190-1; italics in original. 
 
Thus, the only kind of equations that can play any role in the analytical activities of the Political 
Arithmetician and the Accountant are Diophantine equations. How can the problem of solvability of 
such equations be studied and what methods are available to systematise and routinise their use? The 
paradoxical answer to both of these questions is that the problem of solvability is intractable and their 
systematic and routinised study is almost impossible. They share, with that other `Cinderella of pure 
mathematics',  nonlinear differential and difference equations, a Linnean status, as poignantly and 
accurately described by George Temple
24: 
 
"The group of problems which I propose to describe belong to that Cinderella of pure mathematics- the 
study of Diophantine equations. The closely guarded secret of this subject is that it has not yet attained 
the status and dignity of a science, but still enjoys the freedom and freshness of such pre-scientific study 
as natural history compared with botany. The student of Diophantine equations ... is still living at the 
stage where his main tasks are to collect specimens, to describe them with loving care, and to cultivate 
them for study under laboratory conditions. The work of classification and systematization has hardly 
begun.    .... 
... An inviting flora of rare equations and exotic problems lies before a botanical excursion into the 
Diophantine field." 
Temple, 1958, p.233; italics added. 
 
Why are they intractable? How will they relate to the more conventional analytical approaches via 
the behaviour of rational agents? Indeed, what kind of animals are they? I cannot, of course, go into 
the full details of these `inviting flora of rare equations' but shall try to provide a glimpse into their 
`closely guarded secrets' (using the formalism and definitions in Matiyasevich, 1993). 
 
Definition 2: A relation of the form: 
1 2 1 2 ( , ,....., , , ,..., ) 0 n n D a a a x x x =  
where, D is a polynomial with integer coefficients with respect to all the variables (integer or rational 
valued): 
{ 1 2 1 2 , ,....., , , ,..., n n a a a x x x } 
separated into parameters:  
  { 1 2 , ,....., n a a a } 
and unknowns:   
  { 1 2 , ,..., n x x x } 




Definition 3:  
D in Definition 2 defines a set Á of the parameters for which there are values of the unknowns such 
that: 
 
[ ] 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 , ,..., , ,..., ( , ,..., , , ,..., ) 0 n m n m a a a x x x D a a a x x x ÎÁÛ $ =   
Loosely speaking, the relations denoted in the above two definitions can be called Diophantine 
representations.  Then  sets,  such  as  Á,  having  a  Diophantine  representation,  are  called  simply 
Diophantine. With this much terminology at hand, it is possible to state the fundamental problem of 
Diophantine equations as follows: 
 
Problem: A set, say: 
 
1 2 , ,..., n a a a ÎÁ 
 
is given. Determine if this set is Diophantine. If it is, find a Diophantine representation for it. 
 
Of course, the set Á may be so structured as to possess equivalence classes of properties, P and 
relations, R. Then it is possible also to talk, analogously, about a Diophantine representation of a 
Property P or a Diophantine representation of a Relation R. For example, in the latter case we have: 
 
[ ] 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ( , ,....., ) , ,..., ( , ,..., , , ,..., ) 0 n m n m R a a a x x x D a a a x x x Û $ =  
 
Hence,  given,  say  partially  ordered  preference  relations,  it  is  possible  to  ask  whether  it  is 
Diophantine and, if so, search for a Diophantine representation for it. Next, how can we talk about the 
solvability of a Diophantine representation? This is where undecidability (and uncomputability) will 
enter this family of `inviting flora of rare equations' - through a remarkable connection with recursion 
theory, summarized in the next Proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: 
Given any parametric Diophantine equation, D, it is possible to construct a Turing Machine, M, such 
that M will eventually Halt, beginning with a representation of the parametric n-tuple: 
 
1 2 , ,..., n a a a  
 
 iff D in Definition 2 is solvable for the unknowns: 
 
{ } 1 2 , ,..., n x x x  
 
But,  then,  given  the  famous  result  on  the  Unsolvability  of  the  Halting  problem  for  Turing 
Machines, we are forced to come to terms with the unsolvability of Diophantine equations.  
 
Remark: 
Given a parametric Diophantine equation, it is possible to use the set of values of its solution to 
emulate the behaviour of a suitably constructed cellular automaton. Conversely, given a universal 
cellular automaton, it is possible to encode any behaviour of its evolution, for given initial conditions, 
as  a  statement  about  the  solution  to  a  parametric  Diophantine  equation.  The  intractability  of 
characterising the limit sets of the dynamics of cellular automata, the unsolvability of the Halting 
problem  for  Turing  Machines  and  the  undecidability  of the solutions for parametric Diophantine 
equations are all aspects of the irrelevance of the search for axiomatic encapsulation and compression 
of fundamentals.  Thus,  once  the  natural  Diophantine  formalism  of  accounting  systems  are  recognised  and 
routinised, their general unsolvability should lead to the kind of ‘assumptions of new freedoms of 
constructions, of thoughts’ and a shift away from ‘precise theorems and axioms’, as envisaged by 
Ulam and Wolfram. I shall go further and suggest, for an economics of the future, the notion of a 
Universal Accounting System, implied by and implying Universal Turing Machines and Universality 
in cellular automata (or dynamical systems, in general), to study value, distribution and growth.   
Hence, the best we can do, as Political Arithmeticians and Accountants, and even as behavioural 
agents, however rational, so long as the constraints are Diophantine, is to act according to the gentle 
and humble precepts enunciated by George Temple: `collect specimens, to describe them with loving 
care, and to cultivate them for study under laboratory conditions'.  Clearly, anyone familiar with the 
work  of  Charles  Sanders  Peirce  will  also  realise  that  this  kind  of  natural  historic  study  fits 
comfortably  with  that  great  man's  advocacy  of  retroduction
25  in  such  disciplines.  The  tiresome 
dichotomy between induction and deduction, refreshingly banished by Peirce more than a century 
ago, may well get cremated in economics, once and forever, if we combine the methodology of the 
natural historian with the epistemology that is implied in retroduction. 
The  headlong  rush  with  which  economists  have  equipped  themselves  with  a  half-baked 
knowledge of mathematical traditions has led to an un-natural mathematical economics and a non-
numerical economic theory. 
Whether this trend will reverse itself of its own volition is very doubtful. But discerning scholars 
of  mathematical  philosophy  -  including  front-ranking  mathematical  theorists  like  Ulam  -  have 
seriously speculated, in the last few years, that the trend in mathematics itself may force a change in 
its methodology and epistemology. If mathematical traditions themselves incorporate the ambiguities 
of structures that are replete with undecidabilites in their bread-and-butter research, it will only be a 
matter of time before such habits will rub off on even the obdurate mathematical economist. Petty, our 
founding father, wanted only to `express [himself] in number, weight or measure'. They need only to 
be linked together by means of parametric Diophantine equations - as Luca Pacioli knew when he 
devised that lasting contribution to mercantile practice: double-entry bookkeeping. 
To get our `pluses' and `minuses' ordered so as to balance the books we do not need anything 
more than parametric Diophantine equations. Through them we enter the weird and wonderful world 
of undecidabilities and uncomputabilities, which is why the economic world, in its macroeconomic 
and microeconomic incarnations, is full of financial ambiguities. To pretend that the economic world 
can  exist  without  such  ambiguities  and,  hence,  occasional  and  systematic  exploitation  of  logical 
loopholes by unethical and immoral practitioners of financial wizardry is dangerous. On the other 
hand, recognizing the intrinsic inevitability of such ambiguities may mean that we might happily, in a 
quantitative economics of the future, return to the Linnean fold, to classify and systematise, particular 




1. Undecidability and incompleteness conceived, naturally, in their formal senses. 
 
2. I am not concerned in this paper with arbitrary applications of computability or undecidability 
theorems in an otherwise unmodified economic theory. I have had my say on such approaches in other 
writings and the interested reader is referred to them for detailed analysis, evaluation and criticisms 
(cf., for example, Velupillai, 2000, 2002 and 2004). 
 
3. The five main subsections were titled: 
·  What is Mathematics? 
·  What is Physics? 
·  The Role of Mathematics in Physical Theories. 
·  Is the Success of Physical Theories Truly Surprising? 
·  The Uniqueness of the Theories of Physics. 
 
4.  The  one  footnote  in  which  intuitionism  is  mentioned  was  a  reference  to  Hilbert's  disdainful 
dismissal of it (Wigner, 1960, footnote 4). 
 
5. I found it surprising that Wigner, in a Richard Courant Lecture, did not refer to Courant's own 
famous attempt at providing an answer to the seemingly simple question `What is Mathematics?' with 
a  whole  book  with  that  title  (Courant  and  Robbins,  1958).  Courant's  answer  was  to  show  what 
mathematics is by describing, explaining and demonstrating what they actually do. That was, perhaps, 
not suitable for Wigner's aims in the lecture. 
 
6. I have in mind Auden's poignant eulogy to Yeats:  
"Mad Ireland hurt you into poetry,  
Now Ireland has her madness and her weather still,  
For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives.. ."  
Auden: `In Memory of W.B.Yeats' (italics added). 
 
7. Dummett's question, and enlightened answer, is entirely consistent with Hardy's analogous question 
and equally felicitous answer - except that the latter aimed at characterizing the mathematician:  
“A mathematician, like a painter or a poet, is a maker of patterns. If his patterns are more permanent than 
theirs, it is because they are made with ideas. A painter makes patterns with shapes and colours, a poet with 
words..... . 
The mathematician's patterns, like the painter's or the poet's, must be beautiful; the ideas, like the colours or the 
words, must fit together in a harmonious way. ... 
It may be very hard to define mathematical beauty ... but that does not prevent us from recognising one when we 
[see] it.”  
Hardy, 1967, pp. 84-5; bold emphasis added. 
 
Hardy's mathematician, who is a `maker of beautiful patterns', is exactly Dummett's `constructor of 
complex deductive arguments'. Just as Dummett's `complex deductive arguments' are arrived at by 
'routes far from immediately obvious', the `beauty' of the patterns devised by Hardy's mathematicians 
are `hard to define'. 
 
8. As David Ruelle perceptively observed in his `Gibbs Lecture': 
“We like to think of the discovery of mathematical structure as walking upon a path laid out be the Gods. But .... 
may be there is no path…..”  
Ruelle, 1988, p.266. 
 9. Adapted from Nelson (199?; no exact date in the source). Anticipating the characterisation of a 
Mathematical Economist in the next section, ME in this dialogue refers to such a being. 
 
10. I could, instead, proceed, at this point, by asking the analogous question: what is a number? or any 
related  question,  substituting,  for  `function'  and  `number',  other  basic  `ideas'  that  are  the  objects 
manipulated by deductive arguments to construct the patterns that pave the route. For reasons of 
convenience and familiarity, I shall confine my discussion to the object referred to as `function'. 
 
11.  I  add  the  name  Dirichlet  to  the  standard  naming  which  justly  credits  Kuratowski  with  this 
definition, for historical reasons. It was Dirichlet who initiated this particular tradition, culminating in 
Kuratowski's `function as a graph' definition. Dirichlet's definition, in terms of open, continuous, 
intervals, remains the touchstone, as one can see from the way the Bishop-style constructivists and the 
Brouwerian Intuitionists have, eventually, defined functions. My source for this ‘historical reason’ is 
Hobson,1927, p.274: 
`It thus appears that an adequate definition of a function for a continuous interval (a,b) must take the form given 
to it by Dirichlet'. Hobson does not elaborate upon the meaning of `adequate', but it certainly had nothing to do 
with `performing a task'.  
Of course, the motivation and criteria in the latter two approaches were quite different from those of 
Dirichlet and Kuratowski. 
 
12. And set theory is only one of at least four sub-branches of mathematical logic; the others being: 
proof theory, recursion theory and model theory. Loosely speaking, but not entirely inaccurately, it is 
possible to associate one particular class of numbers with each of these sub-branches of logic: real 
numbers,  constructive  numbers,  computable  numbers  and  non-standard  numbers,  respectively. 
Analogously,  each  of  these  forms  the  subject  matter  of:  real  analysis,  constructive  analysis, 
computable analysis and non-standard analysis. Which of these numbers and, hence, which kind of 
analysis, is appropriate for economic analysis is almost never discussed in any form or forum of 
mathematical economics or mathematics in economics. It is taken for granted that real numbers and its 
handmaiden, real analysis, is the default domain. Why? 
 
13. Although it may appear paradoxical, I am of the opinion that non-standard analysis should be 
placed squarely in the constructive tradition - at least from the point of view of practice. Ever since 
Leibniz chose a notation for the differential and integral calculus that was conducive to computation, 
a notation that has survived even in the quintessentially non-computational tradition of classical real 
analysis, the practice of non-standard analysis has remained firmly rooted in applicability from a 
computational point of view. Indeed, the first modern rejuvenation of the non-standard tradition in the 
late  50s  and  early  60s,  at  the  hands  of  Schmieden  and  Laugwitz  (1958),  had  constructive 
underpinnings. I add the caveat `modern' because Veronese's sterling efforts (Veronese, 1891) at the 
turn of the 19th century did not succeed in revitalising the subject due to its unfair dismissal by Peano 
and Russell, from different points of view. The former dismissed it, explicitly, for lacking in `rigour'; 
the  latter,  implicitly,  by  claiming  that  the  triple  problems  of  the  infinitesimal,  infinity  and  the 
continuum had been `solved'. 
 
14. Jacob Schwartz observed pungently:  
"The very fact that a theory appears in mathematical form, that, for instance, a theory has provided the occasion 
for the application of a fixed-point theorem ... somehow makes us more ready to take it seriously. ... The result, 
perhaps most common in the social sciences, is bad theory with a mathematical passport. ... The intellectual 
attractiveness of a mathematical argument, ...., makes mathematics a powerful tool of intellectual prestidigitation 
- a glittering deception in which some are entrapped, and some, alas, entrappers."  
Schwartz, 1986, pp. 22-3, italics added.  
15. Robert Kalaba was present at a seminar I gave in the department of economics at the University of 
Southern California, at the invitation of Richard Day, in the early 90s. I posed a similar question at 
that seminar and he enlightened the audience with the interesting story that, at Rand in Santa Monica, 
in  the  early  50s,  intense  discussion  took  place  on  suitable  mathematical  structures  for  economic 
formalizations and it was not, at that time, a foregone conclusion that real analysis and some variety 
of  formalism  -  particularly  the  Bourbakian  version  -  would  come  to  dominate  mathematical 
economics. A few years later Lloyd Shapley, during a luncheon conversation, on the occasion of a 
visit by Alain Lewis to the Center for Computable Economics in the department of economics at 
UCLA of which I was then the Associate Director, confirmed that such discussions did, indeed take 
place at Rand, particularly with Norman Shapiro. I have never been able to go beyond these anecdotal 
observations to substantiate a clear cut case one way or the other.  
16. A question I have been framing, posing and asking mathematical economists, in alternative ways, 
both  formally  and  informally,  directly  and  indirectly,  for  many  years  without  ever  getting  any 
satisfactory answer. It is not that the issue has not been addressed by eminent theorists in recent and 
less-than-recent years (Gomory and Baumol, 1960, Clower-Howitt, 1978 and Scarf, 1990). I shall 
return to this theme in the concluding section, too. 
 
17. The paragraph and page references in the six ‘bullet points’ are all to Debreu (1959). 
 
18. I should, for completeness, add a list of the deductive rules that are valid in different kids of 
mathematics,  too.  For  example,  the  reason  for  the  failure  of  the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in 
constructive mathematics is the uncritical use of the law of the excluded middle. This law and the law 
of double negation are the 'culprits' in the failure of the Brouwer fixed-point theorem in Brouwerian 
Intuitionistic mathematics. But I have refrained from making these explicit in view of the brief hints 
given in the previous section. 
 
19.  My  translation  of  the  last  line  from  a  stanza  of  one  of  Antonio  Machado's  great  Cantares: 
“Caminante no hay camino, se hace camino al andar. Al andar se hace camino, y al volver la vista atras se ve la 
senda que nunca se ha de volver a pisar. ...” 
 
20. It is impossible to justify or explain, within the brief span of a few paragraphs, the rich tapestry 
and the many-pronged structure of Wolfram’s New Kind of Science. In the original version of this 
paper there was no mention of the relation of the message I am trying to convey in this paper and its 
possible embedding within Wolfram’s vision. However, a perceptive referee expressed a wish to ‘see 
some reference to Wolfram’s New Kind of Science’, pointing out, further, that NKS ‘deals with some 
of the same areas as does this paper and might tie in the arguments better into broader work.’ There is 
a great deal of truth in the referee’s interesting remark and the few paragraphs do not do complete 
justice to the correctness of the conjecture. However, I do develop the relationship of the kind of 
message in this paper with Wolfram’s vision in a separate paper (cf., Albin, Foley and Velupillai, 
2004). 
 
21. That there will be a role for Shapley Values and a place for cooperative game theory in such a 
vision is exemplified by the fact that cost accountants have, for years, grappled with the problem of 
joint cost imputations and joint production by using these concepts in fertile and imaginative ways. 
Shubik  was  early  to  recognise  such  a  role  for  cooperative  game  theory  and  Shapley  Values  (cf. 
Shubik, 1962 and Shubik, 1986). There remains the problem that the domain of analysis for these 
concepts is the real number system. It will be an interesting challenge to device a formalism for 
cooperative game theory and its solutions in terms of computable or constructive numbers.  
22. The lasting contribution of economic analysis, to the mercantile culture of the modern era, was - 
in my opinion - double-entry bookkeeping. The Political Arithmetician and the Accountant has to deal 
with credit as well as the debit side of such bookkeeping discipline and, hence, it is not enough to 
confine attention to equations constrained by non-negative numbers. Negative numbers, even in their 
origin, play a role in double-entry bookkeeping. 
 
23. Simply substitute `economic theory' for `probability theory', when reading this quote! 
 
24. I have taken the liberty of substituting Diophantine equations for differential equations in the 
quoted paragraph. 
 
25. Even knowledgeable scholars persist in referring to retroduction as abduction, in spite of Peirce 
explicitly stating: `....apagwgh should be translated not by the word abduction, as the custom of the 
translators is, but rather by reduction or retroduction'. (Peirce, 1898, p.141; italics in the original). 
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